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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article reviews the history of discovery in Minnesota 
practice under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, analyzes 
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        ††  JoLynn M. Markison is a Labor & Employment associate in Dorsey & 
Whitney LLP’s Minneapolis office. She focuses her practice on employment 
litigation and counseling, and has litigated complex cases involving e-discovery 
issues in the areas of noncompete, trade secret, and unfair competition litigation. 
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2014] E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE MINNESOTA RULES 391 
the place of electronic discovery in Minnesota today, and attempts 
to predict how the courts may deal with electronic discovery issues 
in the future. At one point it was reasonable to analogize 
Minnesota e-discovery to Minnesota’s infamous weather—everyone 
was talking about it but no one was doing anything about it. With 
amendments to the rules in recent years, that is not really a fair 
criticism, as the Minnesota courts have attempted to prevent 
e-discovery from subverting the strong policy goal of resolving 
disputes promptly, fairly, and inexpensively. 
Minnesota has historically followed the lead of the federal 
courts in establishing court rules.1 This article discusses how that 
has occurred with respect to discovery in particular, and reviews 
how e-discovery problems have emerged as major challenges to the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of civil cases 
promised by Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
This article explores the history of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
efforts to deal with the challenges of e-discovery, both in following 
federal rule changes where they are deemed wise and in forging its 
own solutions where the federal solutions are either ill-suited to 
Minnesota or too limited to address the issues sufficiently.3 In 2013, 
the court adopted recommendations of its Civil Justice Reform 
Task Force to deal with some of these issues, many without federal 
court counterparts.4 
This article attempts to predict what the future may hold for 
e-discovery in Minnesota.5 Those predictions will be informed by 
the following articles in this issue, but if history is any guide, the 
Minnesota solution to e-discovery problems will involve considered, 
measured review of any federal court rule reforms, together with 
careful consideration of changes originating in Minnesota or 
tailored to Minnesota’s needs. 
II. BACKGROUND ON COURT RULES AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
In the early days of litigation under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure (since 1938 in federal courts and since 1953 in 
 
 1.  See infra Part IV. 
 2.  See infra Part IX. 
 3.  See infra Part IV, VIII. 
 4.  See infra Part IX. 
 5.  See infra Part XI. 
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Minnesota state courts), electronic discovery really didn’t exist.6 
Commerce was not conducted in cyberspace and records were not 
created or stored in electronic form. The rules reflected the greater 
world—discovery involved witnesses, paper documents, and 
occasionally tangible things other than documents. Entire files on 
transactions existed in a single file folder, and a thin one at that. If 
copies of documents existed, they were necessarily “carbon 
copies,”7 unless a scrivener had been employed to create a 
duplicate. If there were copies, they would generally number one 
or two (more than that would be illegible). 
How the world has changed! The photocopy machine 
probably brought the most dramatic change in the world of 
commerce that impacted the litigation process. Suddenly 
numerous copies might be created of documents that might be 
relevant to a civil dispute. Additionally, the litigation process itself 
could create multiple additional copies of the documents. But the 
photocopier’s impact pales in comparison to the changes wrought 
by the high-speed digital computer. These machines have brought 
changes the rule makers never contemplated. The rules 
committees have been playing catch-up ever since.8 
While the changes in the use of computers in virtually every 
corner of our lives are clear and undisputable, questions about how 
these changes should be reflected in the judicial process never have 
been easy to answer. It is tempting just to say that electronic 
 
 6.  Current versions of the Minnesota and Federal Rules are most frequently 
accessed by consulting 1 MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (2013) (state rules) and 
FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES (Westlaw rev. ed. 2013). Local rules 
for the federal courts in Minnesota are found in 2 MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT 
(2013) (federal rules). Those volumes contain compilations of the various 
amendments to the state and federal civil rules. Similar compilations of the 
Minnesota state civil rules are also available in volume 15 of the MINNESOTA 
STATUTES (2012), and of the federal civil rules in 28 U.S.C. (2006).  
 7.  “[A] thin paper faced with a waxy pigmented coating so that when placed 
between two sheets of paper the pressure of writing or typing on the top sheet 
causes transfer of pigment to the bottom sheet.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 185 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “carbon paper”). Carbon paper allowed 
the creation of a single copy; multiple copies could be made by using very thin 
paper, familiarly known as “tissue” paper, and multiple sets of carbon paper and 
the tissue paper. Each layer in the sandwich was a little less clear than the last. 
 8.  The “crisis” of e-discovery is not universally viewed as dire. For an article 
suggesting that the e-discovery crisis might be a little overblown, see James M. 
Rosenbaum, The Death of E-Discovery, FED. LAW., July 2007, at 26, 26. 
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records are the equivalent of documents and should simply be 
treated as documents in discovery and proof at trial. This is a 
simple approach, and it has served to answer many simple 
questions. However, it ignores that as computer systems evolved, 
electronic records acquired features that distinguished them from 
their paper forebears—multiple versions were created, often with 
no notice to or action by the user. Probably the most important 
form of data in the world of electronic documents with no real 
counterpart in paper documents is metadata.9 
Discovery has been a substantial part of Minnesota civil 
procedure since Minnesota adopted the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1952.10 The Minnesota rules closely followed the 
 
 9.  See generally BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 3 (2007). The Manual for 
Complex Litigation identifies (and defines) several categories of data, most of 
which really don’t typically exist in paper-based systems:  
 Metadata. These include information about a particular file, attached to it 
and part of it electronically, but usually not part of what might be printed, 
and often not even readily accessible by the user. A good example is 
information about each document in most word processing documents that 
shows when it was created, by whom, when it was last edited, by whom, etc.  
 System Data. These are data created and maintained by the computer itself, 
and include a wide array of settings, logs of activity, records on file location, 
access to other devices, changes in settings, etc.  
 Backup Data. These are data created or maintained for the purpose of short-
term disaster recovery, and can include backup files on the host computer, 
though most often these data are on separate disks or tapes stored away from 
the host computer system.  
 Files Purposely Deleted by a User.  
 Residual Data. These data may arise for several reasons, but essentially are 
underlying data that are not removed when part of a block of memory is 
used for another purpose. These may not comprise an entire file, but rather 
just pieces of it. 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 11.446, at 77–79 
(2004). Each of these categories may involve information that may be relevant to 
litigation and may properly be discoverable. Id. at 79. Many of them would be, or 
would be in some situations, “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden 
or cost,” and would therefore not be routinely discoverable under FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(B) or MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(2).  
 10.  See MINNESOTA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT 26–37 
(1951). For discussion of the rules’ consideration and adoption in Minnesota, see 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, WRIGHT’S MINNESOTA RULES (1954). See also David Louisell, 
Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 633 (1952) 
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provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been 
adopted in 1938. Since that original adoption, Minnesota has 
generally followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court 
and has considered and adopted federal rules changes. The 
problems of discovery reform have, in many states, led state rule 
makers to impose limitations on wide-open discovery.11 Minnesota 
has been part of that trend, imposing a numerical limit on the use 
of interrogatories. In 1968 the number of permitted interrogatories 
was limited to fifty.12 Not until 1993 would the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure impose any such limit, when a twenty-five interrogatory 
limit was imposed.13 In 1996 Minnesota considered, but declined to 
adopt, that lower twenty-five interrogatory limit..14 
E-discovery issues have confronted the Federal Rules 
Committee, and that Committee recommended important rule 
changes in 2006 that the Supreme Court adopted.15 Those changes 
took effect on December 1, 2006.16 Minnesota followed with the 
2007 amendments to the Minnesota Rules, adopting the federal 
changes in substantial part.17 
The Federal Advisory Committee continues to wrestle with 
e-discovery and is currently considering rule amendments that 
would address some of the pending issues.18 We can expect that 
 
(comparing the Minnesota discovery rules with the newly adopted federal 
discovery rules); Note, Discovery Practice in States Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 68 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1955) (comparing several states’ discovery rules 
with the newly adopted federal discovery rules). 
 11.  See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: 
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making 
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1216 (2005) (“Most jurisdictions . . . impose some 
form of rule-based limits on discovery volume.”). 
 12.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a) advisory committee’s comment (1968 
amendment). 
 13.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) advisory committee’s note (1993 amendment).  
 14.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a) advisory committee’s comment (1996 
amendment).  
 15.  See infra Part VII. 
 16.  By statute, the Supreme Court adopts rules that take effect on December 
1st of the year of adoption, provided that they are submitted to Congress by May 
1st and Congress does not act to prevent their effectiveness. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) 
(2012).  
 17.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. (2007), with MINN. R. CIV. P. (2007). 
 18. See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. 
on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. 
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those changes, if eventually adopted in the federal courts, will in 
time be taken up by the Minnesota Supreme Court and its Advisory 
Committee. But Minnesota has not slavishly followed federal rule 
amendments, nor has it confined itself to rule changes adopted in 
federal courts. E-discovery issues are a likely candidate for further 
rulemaking unrelated to any limitation federal-rule amendments, 
especially if a consensus were to develop as to the nature and 
seriousness of the problems faced in Minnesota. 
In 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted significant 
rule changes that originated not with its Advisory Committee on 
Rules of Civil Procedure, but with the Minnesota Supreme Court 
Task Force on Civil Justice Reform.19 The Task Force 
recommendations were not focused particularly on e-discovery, but 
 
on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 8, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov 
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf; see also infra Part X. 
 19.  See Order Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001, Order Adopting 
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (Minn. Feb. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511; Order Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001, 
Order Promulgating Corrective Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Minn. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511; Order 
Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001, Order Authorizing Expedited Civil Litigation 
Track Pilot Project and Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Minn. May 7, 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511. These 
orders amended or adopted the following rules:  
MINN. R. CIV. P. 1  Added new proportionality provision.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 3 
 Added cross-reference to new filing requirement in 
MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04 
 Added new requirement that actions be filed within 
one year of commencement.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 26 
 Added automatic disclosure requirements. 
 Recast proportionality requirement in MINN. R. CIV. 
P. 26.02(b). 
 Created mandatory discovery conference and 
discovery plan.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 37 
 Provided for sanctions for failure to make required 
disclosures or failure to participate in framing a 
discovery plan.
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 
8.13, 104, 111, 114, 146 
 Modified scheduling process and adopted new Civil 
Cover Sheet.
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 
115.04(d) 
 Adopted new expedited motion procedure for 
nondispositive motions.
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 146  Adopted procedure for Complex Case Project. 
 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/3
 
396 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
necessarily addressed it. Probably the most significant provision 
recommended by the Task Force and adopted by the court is the 
inclusion of an express requirement for consideration of 
proportionality.20 This important amendment to Rule 1 is not 
modeled after any existing provision in the Federal Rules.21 
Proportionality is one of the most important issues on the 
e-discovery front. 
Because Minnesota has not marched in lockstep with the 
federal courts on matters of procedure, it is not possible to predict 
that it will simply sit back and wait for the Federal Rules process to 
end. The recent activities of both the Minnesota and Federal Rules 
Advisory Committees, as well as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
concern about the issues, as reflected in its appointment of a Civil 
Justice Reform Task Force and adoption of several 
recommendations of that task force, suggest that these issues are 
important. It is reasonable to predict that if the Federal Rules are 
amended to deal with e-discovery issues, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court will take a serious look at the amendments and ask its 
Advisory Committee to consider their merits for adoption in 
Minnesota. In addition, Minnesota may well look at other solutions, 
as it has in the past, either out of greater concern about the 
problems or the presence of issues in state court litigation that are 
not really present in federal court litigation.22 
It seems implicit that the civil dispute resolution process 
should not consume more in litigation costs than is involved in the 
dispute. This notion has not been embraced in any court rule or 
policy, but seems fundamental.23 That recognition should drive 
 
 20.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (effective July 1, 2013). 
 21.  See infra Part X.A. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“It is the responsibility of 
the court . . . to examine each civil action to assure that the process and the costs 
are proportionate to the amount in controversy . . . .”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 1 
(containing no such clause). 
 22.  See infra text accompanying notes 37–46. 
 23.  This disputed notion of balancing cost versus amount was expressly 
considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task Force in its 
December 23, 2011, Final Report. The task force observed: “High litigation costs 
cause parties to forgo claims that do not exceed the litigation expenses . . . . The 
surveys and studies also present evidence of agreement that litigation costs also 
drive cases to settle for reasons unrelated to the substantive merit of the claims or 
defenses.” RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 11 (Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://www 
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innovative approaches to provide e-discovery that is needed to 
present the merits of the parties’ cases for resolution, without 
consuming the parties’ resources and exhausting the courts 
through obtaining and reviewing electronic records that do not 
help with that resolution in a meaningful way. 
III. THE “ELECTRONIC DARK AGES” (1938–1952) 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.24 
They came about after extensive study and discussion with the 
bench and bar, and with input from the academic community. The 
rules brought many changes but didn’t address electronic discovery 
in any meaningful way. Quite simply, they didn’t need to. High-
speed digital computing didn’t exist, at least not outside the 
laboratory, and records were created and maintained on paper and 
in file cabinets (if retained at all). 
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,25 the Federal Rules 
have repeatedly been amended since their adoption. The adoption 
process requires promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court with 
the effective date deferred to December 1st of the year of adoption, 
giving Congress the ability to intercede to prevent any rule from 
taking effect.26 The amendments have kept the rules current and 
have helped them adapt to developments in the types of cases filed 
and their case management needs. An important amendment was 
made in 1946, adding a provision to Rule 26 that provided that, at a 
deposition, “[i]t is not ground for objection that the testimony 
sought . . . appears reasonably calculated to . . . the discovery of 




 24.  4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the formulation of the Federal 
Rules). 
 25.  Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). For discussion of the Act, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
 26.  The history of adoption and early amendments to the Federal Rules is set 
forth in 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, §§ 1001–08. 
 27.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1946). 
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all discovery by the 1970 reorganizing amendments to the discovery 
rules.28 
Discovery itself was one of the major innovations of the Federal 
Rules. The merger of law and equity probably is more earthshaking 
and fundamentally important to the structure of civil litigation, but 
the creation of routine use of discovery in any type of case 
undoubtedly was important and one of the enduring impacts on 
most civil cases. The establishment of discovery by the rules was 
fairly viewed as revolutionary.29 
IV. THE REUNION OF FEDERAL AND MINNESOTA CIVIL PROCEDURE 
IN 1953 
The years 1938 and 1953 are the bookends of the period when 
the federal courts were using their new rules of civil procedure and 
the Minnesota courts were continuing to follow statute-based rules 
of procedure.30 
Minnesota did not immediately embrace the changes made in 
the federal courts in 1938; not until 1953 did Minnesota adopt the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, modeled closely on the 
Federal Rules as they then existed.31 Since 1953, Minnesota has 
generally followed—not quite in lockstep and usually with some 
time lag—the developments in the Federal Rules.32 There have 
been relatively few federal procedural changes that did not see 
eventual adoption in Minnesota.33 
 
 28.  The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules were adopted in Minnesota 
in 1975. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The 
Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 202 (2001); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734 (1998). 
 30.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. (1938), and FED. R. CIV. P. (1953) (exemplifying 
the federal courts’ use of new rules), with MINN. R. CIV. P. (1938), and MINN. R. 
CIV. P. (1953) (demonstrating Minnesota courts’ use of statute-based rules). 
 31.  MINN. R. CIV. P. (1952). The adoption of the rules in Minnesota is also 
discussed in note 10. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 32.  See generally David F. Herr, A Parting of Ways? Amendments to the Civil 
Rules—State and Federal, BENCH & B. MINN., July 2000, at 29, available at http://www 
.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/jul00/civil-rules.htm (discussing the history of 
the relationship between the Minnesota and Federal Rules). 
 33.  The most sweeping of the federal amendments, although arguably the 
most insignificant from a substantive standpoint, were the 2007 so-called 
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A good example of Minnesota’s approach to the Federal Rules, 
especially relevant to the issues here, occurred in 1975. In 1970, the 
Federal Rules were extensively amended, with the changes focusing 
on discovery.34 Not until five years later, in 1975, did Minnesota 
amend its rules to adopt the vast majority of those changes.35 This 
lag is typical of the approach the Minnesota Supreme Court and its 
Advisory Committees have taken to federal rule amendments. The 
1970 federal amendments were significant and changed many 
aspects of discovery practice.36 The 1975 amendments to the 
Minnesota rules were similarly impactful because they made several 
important changes to how discovery is conducted, and the Advisory 
Committee carefully considered the desirability of each change.37 
More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not been as 
slavish in its consideration of federal rule changes. A good example 
of this came with the 1991 federal rule amendments, which made 
important and far-reaching changes, including the revamping and 
relabeling of post-trial motions.38 These amendments were not 
adopted in Minnesota until 2006.39 This lag initially is attributable 
to reluctance to make changes that were both far reaching in 
impact and nominally trivial—the mere relabeling of the motions 
 
“restyling” amendments. Those amendments to the federal rules restyled the 
federal rules but were intended not to change the meaning or interpretation of 
the rules. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without 
Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761 (2004). These changes have not been given 
substantive attention by the Minnesota Supreme Court for adoption in Minnesota. 
For a discussion of the elusiveness of changing wording without changing 
meaning, see Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139 (2010). 
 34.  See FED. R. CIV. P. (1970). 
 35.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. (1975). 
 36.  See, e.g., 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2003 (3d ed. 2010). 
 37.  The 1975 changes in Minnesota practice were just as extensive as the 
1970 amendments were to federal discovery practice, and their importance was as 
well. The 1975 Minnesota amendments are analyzed in detail in William B. 
Danforth, The 1975 Amendments to the Minnesota Discovery Rules, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 39 (1977). 
 38.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b) advisory committee’s note (1991 
amendment). Under these changes, the motion for directed verdict under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 50(a) and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) were 
redefined and relabeled, both becoming motions for “judgment as a matter of 
law.” 
 39.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. (2006). 
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would not seem to justify the substantial risk that parties would fail 
to file the motions properly and the risks that would flow from that 
failure.40 
Since 1953, Minnesota has had a history of following the lead 
of the federal courts in amending the rules of procedure. A cogent 
statement on the guiding philosophy of the Advisory Committee on 
state conformity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
provided to the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Committee’s 
report in 1996, recommending adoption of several, but not all, of 
the federal amendments that had followed the Committee’s most 
recent report to the court. The Committee stated: 
The committee continues to believe that, as a general 
principle, it is desirable to have the rules governing 
practice in the state courts parallel as closely as practicable 
the rules in federal court. This general principle guides 
some of the recommendations made above. The 
committee has always recognized, however, that litigation 
in the state courts is different from that in the federal 
courts, and that Minnesota concerns may dictate different 
rules.41 
In many ways, this statement articulates a very consistently 
applied guiding principle. The 1996 report containing it 
recommended against the adoption of automatic disclosures, which 
 
 40.  The bringing of post-trial motions has a substantial impact on appellate 
review in Minnesota appellate practice. See generally 3 ERIC J. MAGNUSON, DAVID F. 
HERR & SAM HANSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: APPELLATE RULES ANNOTATED 
§§ 103.16–.19 (2013 ed.) (discussing scope of review and limitations caused by 
failure to raise issues in post-trial motions, especially motions for a new trial under 
MINN. R. CIV. P. 59).  
 41.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 2 (July 22, 1996) [hereinafter 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1996], available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents 
/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Civil%20Procedure%20Rules 
%20ADM04-8001%20formerly%20C6-84-2134/1996-07-29%20SC%20Advisory%20 
Cmte%20Report.pdf; see also RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 2 (Sept. 26, 
2005) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS 2005], available at http://www.mncourts 
.gov/Documents/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Civil 
%20Procedure%20Rules%20ADM04-8001%20formerly%20C6-84-2134/2005-09 
-26%20Civ%20Proc%20Final%20Rpt.pdf (reiterating preference for having state 
rules conform to federal counterparts). 
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had been adopted in federal court only three years earlier.42 
Automatic disclosures were not adopted in Minnesota until 2013.43 
In 1988, the Minnesota Advisory Committee proposed and 
recommended to the court extensive amendments to delete 
gender-specific language from the rules.44 These amendments also 
included an amendment to Minnesota Rule 30.02 to provide for 
taking depositions by telephone, adopting language identical to the 
1980 amendment to the federal counterpart to that rule.45 
In 1999, the Advisory Committee recommended that the court 
adopt changes to Minnesota Rule 11 to conform the rule to Federal 
Rule 11 as it had been amended in 1993.46 The Advisory Committee 
also recommended that the court defer any action on adoption of 
the automatic disclosure provisions that the Federal Rules adopted 
in 1996.47 It was not until 2013 that those rules would become part 
of Minnesota practice.48 
In 2006, the Committee recommended several changes to the 
Minnesota Rules, including four that involved virtually wholesale 
adoption in Minnesota of recently adopted federal rule 
amendments.49 These included adoption of Federal Rule 23 on 
class actions,50 Rule 53 on special masters,51 Rule 50 on the 
 
 42.  See RECOMMENDATIONS 1996, supra note 41, at 3. Minnesota’s reluctance 
to embrace automatic disclosures was undoubtedly at least partly a product of the 
controversial reception disclosure had received in the federal courts. As originally 
adopted in 1993, districts were allowed to opt out of its provisions, and more than 
one-fourth of the districts had done so, including many of the larger metropolitan 
districts with larger caseloads. See Stempel, supra note 29, at 199 n.14. The option 
to opt out by local rule adopted in 1993 was removed by the 2000 amendments to 
the rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000 
amendment). 
 43.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (effective July 1, 2013). 
 44.  See RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: FINAL REPORT 2 (Mar. 25, 1988). 
 45.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 30.02 advisory committee’s comment (1988 
amendment). This rule provision is currently numbered MINN. R. CIV. P. 30.02(g). 
 46.  Id. R. 11 advisory committee’s comment (1999 amendment). 
 47.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 




 48.  See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See RECOMMENDATIONS 2005, supra note 41. 
 50.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment). 
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nomenclature for post-trial motions,52 and—importantly, for the 
subject of this article—amendments to Rules 26 and 30 to modify 
the scope of discovery and limit the duration of depositions.53 
V. THE CIVIL RULES AND THE EARLY DAYS OF THE COMPUTER AGE 
Because neither the Federal nor Minnesota Rules provided 
explicit rules for dealing with computers and data in electronic 
formats, the courts were initially left to resolve issues relating to 
data created or residing on computer systems under rules that 
contemplated documents as paper things. The courts had rules 
that were intended to diminish the role of formalism, and 
electronic documents could be treated as “documents.”54 In the 
early days, applying the existing rules worked just fine to answer 
discovery issues that occasionally arose. The simple question of 
“what would the answer be for paper records?” worked to answer 
questions about computer records. If a party maintained records 
on a computer system, most courts had little difficulty concluding 
that they were “documents” and thus discoverable to the extent 
their paper counterparts would have been.55 As volume increased, 
however, and as computer systems didn’t really emulate the paper 
world, the answers provided by the rules proved more elusive and 
less satisfactory. File cabinets didn’t generally contain every draft of 
paper documents or detailed records of every change to every 
document. Letters occasionally would be copied to a few additional 
recipients or might attach a single earlier piece of correspondence. 
In the e-mail world, letters might be directed to a long list of 
recipients or even to a group list. Dozens of earlier rounds of 
messages might be appended, and any of those forwarded to 
others. The result is a collection of issues that the rules just didn’t 
address well, and the “analogy to paper” wasn’t obvious—there 
wasn’t necessarily a clear analogy to paper. 
The courts’ recognition of electronic data and information as 
“documents” gained significant traction in the early 1970s. In 1970, 
 
 51.  Id. R. 53 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment). 
 52.  Id. R. 50 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment). 
 53.  Id. R. 26.02, 30.04 advisory committee’s comments (2006 amendment). 
 54.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (applying the same procedure for producing 
“documents or electronically stored information”). 
 55.  See infra notes 56, 67.  
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Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to 
provide for the production of “data compilations from which 
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the 
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable 
form.”56 Professors Wright and Miller characterized this language as 
“bringing the rules ‘into the computer age.’”57 In Adams v. Dan 
River Mills, Inc.,58 the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia applied these rule changes to require 
production of computer cards and tapes, stating: 
Examination of the notes of the Advisory Committee on 
Rules pertaining to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure reveals that the Committee was aware of the 
effect which technology in the field of electronic data 
processing might have in discovery. The notes of the 
Committee state in part: 
The inclusive description of ‘documents’ is revised to 
accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 
34 applies to electronic data compilations from which 
information can be obtained only with the use of 
detection devices, and that when data can as a practical 
matter be made usable by the discovering party only 
through respondent’s devices, respondent may be 
required to use his devices to translate the data to usable 
form. In many instances, this means that respondent will 
have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden 
thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and 
the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect 
respondent against undue burden or expense, either by 
restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering 
party pay costs . . . . 
While it appears to this court that the above language 
only directly covers the situation where the respondent 
can be required to prepare the information in a usable 
form, such as a print-out, it does not appear to preclude 
the production of computer in-put information such as 
computer cards or tapes. Likewise, this court is aware of 
 
 56.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) advisory committee’s notes (1970 amendment). 
See also Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schiltz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1136 
(S.D. Tex. 1976).  
 57.  Pearl Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. at 1136 (citing 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
36, § 2218). 
 58.  54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972). 
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no reason why documents of this nature should not be 
subject to discovery.59 
Based on the 1970 amendments to Rule 34, courts frequently 
ordered parties to produce computer printouts,60 computer cards 
or tapes,61 and even allowed an opposing party to use the 
producing party’s computer machinery for duplication or 
replication of regularly compiled information.62 Courts also showed 
a willingness to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to produce 
such information in response to legitimate discovery requests.63 
Similarly, courts regularly entertained requests to shift the costs of 
preparing and producing electronic information to the requesting 
party.64 
The courts’ focus on broad functionality continues to provide 
the answers to numerous e-discovery questions, even as technology 
evolves. A digital record of an x-ray examination under the rules 
 
 59.  Id. at 222 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (1970 
amendment)) (requiring the production of electronic records even after paper 
versions had been previously requested and produced). This would not be the 
presumptive ruling under the Federal Rules following the 2006 amendments, as 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(iii) explicitly provides that a party need not produce 
electronically stored information in more than one form.  
 60.  See, e.g., Macrovision Corp. v. VSA, Ltd., No. 88-315-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11246, at *8 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 1989); Colorado v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. 
Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1986); Adams, 54 F.R.D. at 222. 
 61.  See, e.g., Kuenz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Nos. 83-1469C(3), 
84-0475C(3), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21858, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 1985); 
Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 77 Civ. 6259 (SWK), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23346, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1985); Allen v. Isaac, 100 F.R.D. 373, 377 (N.D. Ill. 
1983); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16068, 
*15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 1980); Adams, 54 F.R.D. at 222. But see Williams v. Owens-Ill., 
Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of motion to compel 
production of computer tapes where all information contained on the tapes was 
included in wage cards, which were produced). 
 62.  See, e.g., Macrovision Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, at *8 (requiring 
defendant to use its computer devices to translate data into usable form for 
plaintiff). 
 63.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 
555–56 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 64.  See, e.g., Williams v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 
(W.D. Ky. 1987); Kuenz, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21858, at *2–3; Adams, 54 F.R.D. at 
222. But see Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648–51 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming district 
court’s decision not to shift the cost of computer discovery to the requesting 
party). 
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should be expected to be just as discoverable as a silver-emulsion 
film would be. These functional equivalencies have also served to 
analyze evidentiary issues, although questions under the rules of 
evidence may be more complicated, or at least different. A digital 
photograph is not identical to a Kodachrome print, and even less 
so to a Kodachrome negative. (Digital photos may be more readily 
altered, at least at the clumsy level.65) Digital x-rays may reveal clear 
evidence of an injury or no suggestion of it, depending on contrast 
and other settings of the playback device, but this does not prevent 
the discovery of the images.66 
VI. THE ADVENT OF “E-DISCOVERY” AS A NEW SET OF ISSUES 
At some point courts, litigators, and commentators recognized 
that some of the differences between the world of paper and the 
world of electronics didn’t map to each other perfectly.67 Some 
things that worked just fine for paper didn’t really work so well for 
electronics. As electronic discovery advanced, the traditional 
approach became only the starting point. The question 
transformed to become, first, what would the answer be for paper 
records, but would then be modified to consider the additional 
issues such as volume, number of locations, and data volatility.68 
These issues can be addressed by courts on a case-by-case basis, but 
 
 65.  For discussion of the evidentiary issues relating to evidence that is 
created or exists in electronic form, see Keiko L. Sugisaka & David F. Herr, 
Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or Evidence as Usual?, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1453 (2009). For particular focus on digital photographs, see 
Christine A. Guilshan, Note, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging 
and the Future of the Admissibility of Photographs into Evidence, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 365 (1992). 
 66.  See, e.g., Suzanne Collins, Medical Malpractice Litigation: What Are the 
Foundational Requirements for High-Tech Exhibits?, 212 N.J. L.J., May 6, 2013, at 301. 
 67.  Electronic data, unlike paper data, may be incomprehensible when 
separated from its environment. . . . If the raw data (without the 
underlying structure) in a database is produced, it will appear as 
merely a long list of undefined numbers. To make sense of the data, a 
viewer needs the context that includes labels, columns, report formats, 
and other information.  
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 68.  See In re John Doe Proceeding, 680 N.W.2d 792, 809 (Wis. 2004) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
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a strong case can be made to facilitate rules or standards to 
facilitate decisions. It is hard to pinpoint a specific advent of 
“e-discovery” as a separate field of inquiry.69 There was no landmark 
event that marks the beginning of the era; it is marked more by the 
increasing use of digital computers in business and throughout 
society.70 We have all been struggling to keep up ever since. 
Probably the three most important differences of the 
electronic world are persistence, volume, and volatility.71 These are 
somewhat mirror-image features that create different problems in 
very similar ways. Persistence refers to the well-known fact that 
electronic documents, once created or saved on a system, may very 
well persist in some readable form even if they are “deleted.”72 
Some computer systems are designed to ensure some level of 
persistence, by operation of backup and archive systems whose only 
purpose is to preserve copies of records created on the system. The 
persistence problem is amplified by the continued application of 
Moore’s Law and the ever-decreasing cost of mass computer 
storage.73 Flash drives with 64- or 128-gigabyte capacity are now 
readily available.74 Where storing a thousand pages of documents 
 
 69.  An early reference to electronic discovery is found in United States v. 
Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (referring to discovery of electronic 
surveillance records). References in the 1970s and early 1980s are relatively sparse, 
however, and especially sparse in civil cases. 
 70.  See Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of 
Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258–60 (2001); A History of 
Windows, WINDOWS, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/history (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (stating that the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) 
was introduced in 1980, and IBM introduced the personal computer (PC) in 
1981). 
 71.  These differences are discussed by The Sedona Conference Working 
Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production, in THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, supra note 67, at 2−5. 
 72.  Id. at 3. 
 73.  Moore’s Law was articulated in 1980 by Gordon E. Moore, founder of 
semiconductor industry pioneer Intel Corp. It is “an axiom of microprocessor 
development usually holding that processing power doubles about every 18 
months especially relative to cost or size.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 806. For a biography on Moore see IEEE Computer 
Society Awards, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, http://www.computer.org/portal/web 
/awards/moore-goode (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 74.  The capacity of a 64-gigabyte (GB) flash drive depends on the types of 
data stored, but a rule of thumb for Word documents is that a 64-GB drive can 
hold 58,100 documents. SanDisk Support, SANDISK, http://kb.sandisk.com/app 
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was once expensive, the inexorable lowering of the cost makes the 
cost relatively trivial today. Persistence also contributes directly to 
the problem of volume. There are now exponentially more records 
involved in litigation than would once have been possible. 
Volume is a significant difference even aside from the 
persistent accumulation of electronic records.75 The vast size of 
data collections stored on a computer system really converts a 
quantitative difference into a fundamental, qualitative difference. 
Volume relates directly to cost, but not always in an obvious way. It 
is easy to draft a plausible-sounding document request that might 
call for production of a million documents. The same request forty 
years ago might have reached one or two hundred documents. The 
difference is accounted for by the proliferation of record creation 
as well as reproduction and dissemination of records across broad 
networks. Phone messages that would have been regularly 
destroyed when the call was returned now may go into nearly 
permanent computer storage. Computer storage itself might create 
scores of copies in various archive files. 
Volatility refers to the ease with which an electronic document 
can be altered or erased even if no one directly asks that to 
happen.76 The simplest example of this occurs when a document is 
edited and then saved—on some systems the earlier version may be 
overwritten and lost forever. In other systems, it may persist in the 
form of an earlier version of the saved document. Even booting up 
a computer can change data contained on it. 
To address these differences between paper and electronic 
documents, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were extensively 
amended in 2006. 
VII.  THE FEDERAL RULES AMENDMENTS IN 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took 
effect on December 1, 2006, were widely referred to as “e-discovery” 
amendments. They constituted a fairly comprehensive attempt to 
address new and anticipated issues involving e-discovery and 
 
/answers/detail/a_id/3651/~/number-of-photos,-songs,-documents,-and-video 
-hours-a-sandisk-ultra-backup-usb (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 75.  See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 67, at 2. 
 76.  The Sedona Principles refer to volatility as “dynamic, changeable content.” 
Id. at 3. 
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included few other topics. These amendments are now an 
established part of the federal litigation system and are generally 
viewed to have worked well.77 
The amendments in 2006 defined “electronically stored 
information” (ESI) and incorporated the phrase into numerous 
rules to make it clear that disclosure and discovery obligations 
applied equally to “paper” and electronic documents.78 Specifically, 
these amendments included revisions and additions to Rules 16, 
26, 33, 34, 37, and 45, as well as to Form 35. 
The amendments to Rule 16(b) were “designed to alert . . . 
court[s] to the possible need to address the handling of discovery 
of [ESI] early in . . . litigation.”79 Rule 16 now explicitly states that 
the court’s scheduling order may “provide for disclosure or 
discovery of electronically stored information.”80 
The amendments to Rule 26(a), Rule 26(f), and Form 35 
require parties to include ESI in their initial disclosures and to 
“meet and confer” early on regarding ESI data preservation, form 
 
 77.  See generally Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are 
Revitalizing the Civil Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2011, ¶¶ 11, 13 
(“This newfound proficiency [following adoption of the amendments] is finally 
helping achieve the primary goal of civil litigation: ‘the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’”). 
 78.  Rule 34 defines “electronically stored information” to include “writings, 
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data 
or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be 
obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party 
into a reasonably usable form . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). The 2006 Advisory 
Committee Notes make clear that the drafters purposefully did not limit the 
definition of electronically stored information:  
The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity 
of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise 
definition of electronically stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is 
expansive and includes any type of information that is stored 
electronically. . . . The rule covers—either as documents or as 
electronically stored information—information “stored in any 
medium,” to encompass future developments in computer technology. 
Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current 
types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to 
encompass future changes and developments. 
Id. R. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
 79.  Id. R. 16 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).  
 80.  Id. R. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
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of production, and privilege waiver.81 Specifically, Rule 
26(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires each party to disclose, without receiving a 
discovery request, “electronically stored information” in its 
possession, custody, or control that it may use to support its claims 
or defenses.82 Rule 26(f) directs parties to discuss discovery of ESI if 
discovery of ESI is likely to be sought in the action and to 
incorporate any issues related to ESI into their discovery plan.83 
Form 35 was amended to include a report to the court about the 
results of the parties’ discussion about how they intend to handle 
ESI.84 
The amendments to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) created a 
proportionality provision in Rule 26, placing specific limits on the 
discovery of ESI based on an “accessibility” test: 
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. 
. . . . 
(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent. 
. . . . 
(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information. A party need not provide discovery of 
electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. On 
motion to compel discovery or for a protective 
order, the party from whom discovery is sought 
must show that the information is not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that 
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order 
discovery from such sources if the requesting party 
shows good cause, considering the limitations of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify 
conditions for the discovery.85 
Inclusion of these limitations was “designed to address issues 
raised by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery 
of” certain ESI.86 Rule 26(b) now creates a “two-tiered” system for 
 
 81.  See id. R. 26(f)(1); see also id. R. 26(a), Form 35. 
 82.  Id. R. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 83.  Id. R. 26(f)(3)(C). 
 84.  Id. R. 16 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment); see also id. 
Form 52. 
 85.  Id. R. 26(b). 
 86.  Id. R. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
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the discovery of ESI: “accessible” vs. “not reasonably accessible.”87 
The first “tier” consists of accessible ESI, which a responding party 
must produce at its own cost.88 The second “tier” pertains to ESI 
that is “not reasonably accessible.”89 Because some sources of ESI 
can only be accessed “with substantial burden and cost,” Rule 26 
treats those sources of ESI as “not reasonably accessible” and 
requires good cause to obtain discovery of them.90 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 clarify that in 
addition to producing “reasonably accessible” ESI, a responding 
party “must also identify, by category or type, the sources 
containing potentially responsive information that it is neither 
searching nor producing.”91 In addition, “[t]he identification 
should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the 
requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the 
discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on 
the identified sources.”92 Rule 26(b)(2) does not define the 
different types of technological features that may affect the 
burdens and costs of accessing ESI.93 
As further set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes, courts 
may consider various factors in determining whether to require a 
responding party to search for and produce information that is 
“not reasonably accessible.” Those factors include: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the 
quantity of information available from other and more 
easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no 
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the 
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that 
 
 87.  See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ARKFELD ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND 
EVIDENCE § 7.4(G)(1)(a) (3d ed. 2013); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting 
E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215, 222 
(2009). 
 88.  Allman, supra note 87, at 224 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 
216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s note (2006 amendment) (“[A] responding party should produce 
electronically stored information that is relevant, not privileged, and reasonably 
accessible, subject to the (b)(2)(C) limitations that apply to all discovery.”). 
 89.  ARKFELD, supra note 87, § 7.4(G)(1)(a). 
 90.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See id. 
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cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and 
usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance 
of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ 
resources.94 
Even if discovery of ESI that is not reasonably accessible is 
permitted, courts may impose conditions on that discovery, 
including that the requesting party bear some or all of the costs.95 
The amendment to Rule 33(d), which permits a party to 
produce business records in response to an interrogatory, specifies 
that the definition of “business records” includes ESI.96 
Rule 34(a) was amended to confirm that discovery of ESI 
stands on “equal footing” with discovery of paper documents.97 
Rule 34(a)(1)(A) now states that a party may serve a discovery 
request to produce and permit the requesting party to “inspect, 
copy, test, or sample . . . documents or electronically stored information—
including . . . sound recordings, images, and other data . . . stored in any 
medium.”98 Rule 34(b)(1)(C) now states that a document request 
“may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced.”99 Finally, Rule 34(b)(2)(D) and 
(E)(ii)–(iii) state: 
(D) Responding to a Request for Production of 
Electronically Stored Information. The response may state an 
objection to a requested form for producing electronically 
stored information. If the responding party objects to a 
requested form—or if no form was specified in the 
request—the party must state the form or forms it intends 
to use. 
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored 
Information. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the 
court, these procedures apply to producing documents or 
electronically stored information: 
. . . . 
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for 
producing electronically stored information, a party 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. R. 33(d). 
 97.  Id. R. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
 98.  Id. R. 34(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 99.  Id. R. 34(b)(1)(C). 
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must produce it in a form or forms in which it is 
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form 
or forms; and 
(iii) A party need not produce the same 
electronically stored information in more than one 
form.100 
Like Rule 34, Rule 45 was also amended to specifically state 
that a subpoena may command a nonparty to produce or to permit 
the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of “electronically 
stored information” and “may specify the form or forms in which 
electronically stored information is to be produced.”101 The 
subpoenaed person may object in writing to inspecting, copying, 
testing, sampling, or producing ESI in the form or forms 
requested.102 Paralleling the amendments to Rules 26 and 34, the 
amendments to Rule 45 go on to state that a subpoenaed party 
“need not provide discovery of electronically stored information 
from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.”103 
Finally, Rule 37, which grants courts authority to impose 
sanctions for noncompliance with discovery rules, was amended to 
specify that, absent exceptional circumstances, courts may not 
impose sanctions on a party for failing to provide ESI that was lost 
as a result of “the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.”104 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 37 
explains this rule in greater detail: 
When a party is under a duty to preserve information 
because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, 
intervention in the routine operation of an information 
system is one aspect of what is often called a “litigation 
hold.” Among the factors that bear on a party’s good faith 
in the routine operation of an information system are the 
steps the party took to comply with a court order in the 
case or party agreement requiring preservation of specific 
electronically stored information.105 
 
 100.  Id. R. 34(b)(2)(D), (E)(ii)−(iii). 
 101.  Id. R. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), (C)–(D). 
 102.  Id. R. 45(c)(2)(B). 
 103.  Id. R. 45(d)(1)(D). 
 104.  Id. R. 37(e). 
 105.  Id. R. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
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A general consensus has developed that the 2006 federal 
amendments have worked reasonably well and have had a clear 
impact on the civil justice system in federal court.106 
VIII.   ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS IN MINNESOTA IN 2007 
Minnesota adopted the essential provisions of the 2006 federal 
rule amendments in 2007. These amendments were known as 
“e-discovery amendments” because of their particular focus on 
e-discovery and related discovery reform issues. The most 
important changes brought by the 2007 amendments include: a 
provision for addressing e-discovery in scheduling orders;107 
adoption of “two-tier” discovery, making ESI that is not “reasonably 
accessible” not automatically discoverable;108 an express propor-
tionality provision;109 a provision permitting a post-production 
assertion of a claim of privilege and requiring the return of 
information subject to such a claim;110 a requirement that a motion 
for a discovery conference include identification of electronic 
discovery information;111 various provisions for the mechanical 
aspects of e-discovery, including the right to request a specific 
format for production and specifying the formats that are 
acceptable for production;112 and a “safe-harbor” provision to limit 
the imposition of sanctions for loss of information by “routine, 
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”113 The 
e-discovery amendments also revised several rules to make explicit 
that “electronically stored information” is subject to discovery, 
including discovery from nonparties by use of subpoena.114 
In addition, Minnesota Rule 26.06, like Federal Rule 26(f), 
now directs parties to discuss discovery of ESI if ESI is likely to be 
 
 106.  See generally Borden et al., supra note 77, ¶¶ 59−60 (concluding that rules 
have brought changes consistent with Rule 1’s aspiration that the rules operated to 
secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of cases). 
 107.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.02(d). 
 108.  Id. R. 26.02(b)(2). Rule 45.04(a)(4) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure extended this limitation to nonparty discovery by subpoena. 
 109.  Id. R. 26.02(b)(3). 
 110.  Id. R. 26.02(f)(2). 
 111.  Id. R. 26.06(c). 
 112.  Id. R. 34.02. 
 113.  Id. R. 37.05. 
 114.  See, e.g., id. R. 45 advisory committee’s comment (2007 amendment). 
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sought in the action, and to incorporate any issues related to ESI 
into their discovery plan.115 With these changes, the Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to e-discovery became virtually 
identical to the Federal Rules, although Minnesota’s new Rule 1, 
adopted in 2013, creating an across-the-board proportionality 
requirement, is an important Minnesota innovation.116 
An interesting footnote to the 2007 amendments in Minnesota 
is that the Minnesota Advisory Committee once again did not 
recommend adoption of the automatic disclosures that were 
adopted in the federal courts in 1993,117 and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not include any requirement for initial 
disclosures in the 2007 changes to Minnesota Rule 26.118 Automatic 
disclosures would not become part of Minnesota state court 
litigation until 2013, when Minnesota Rule 26 was amended to 
mirror Federal Rule 26.119 Like the Federal Rule, Minnesota Rule 
26.01 now requires each party to disclose, without receiving a 
discovery request and within sixty days of the Answer’s original due 
date,120 “electronically stored information . . . in its possession, 
custody, or control [that it] may use to support its claims or 
defenses.”121 
IX. MINNESOTA ACTS ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
The year 2013 was possibly a landmark year for the Minnesota 
civil justice system, as the Minnesota Supreme Court took 
unmistakable steps to improve the operation of the civil justice 
system. Following several years of study, in 2011 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court received a report from its Civil Justice Reform Task 
 
 115.  Id. R. 26.06(c)(3). 
 116.  Id. R. 1; see infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 117.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1993 amendment) 
(“Through the addition of paragraphs (1)-(4), this subdivision imposes on parties 
a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic 
information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed 
decision about settlement.”), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (2007). 
 118.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (2007). 
 119.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (effective July 1, 
2013). 
 120.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01(a)(3). 
 121.  Id. R. 26.01(a)(1)(B). 
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Force, chaired by the Honorable Louise Dovre Bjorkman, and the 
court responded by implementing several of the recommendations. 
The Task Force was a broadly diverse group of lawyers, judges, 
and court personnel.122 The Task Force met essentially monthly and 
gathered information from various sources, including from a judge 
in Oregon who explained civil justice reform measures adopted 
there.123 The Task Force’s work culminated in a formal report to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.124 This task force report contained 
recommendations on a wide variety of issues, including some that 
intended to address e-discovery issues.125 The recommendations fell 
in several categories: 
1. Proportionality; 
2. Requirement for filing actions within one year; 
3. Adoption of automatic disclosures; 
4. Requirement of a discovery conference of counsel and 
discovery plan in every case (except those excluded 
from the operation of the rule); 
5. Modified case scheduling process; 
6. New expedited motion process; 
7. A new rule on managing complex cases; and 
8. A pilot project for expedited case management in the 
First and Sixth Districts.126 
The task force recommendation that Minnesota adopt the 
automatic disclosure changes adopted in the Federal Rules in 1993 
is important but hardly earthshaking. By 2013, these changes were 
firmly a part of federal court practice and were generally viewed as 
effective at least to some degree in moving important parts of the 
 
 122.  See MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL 
REPORT 1 (Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS 2011], available at 
http://www2.mnbar.org/sections/outstate-practice/Final%20civil%20reform 
%20task%20force%20report.pdf. 
 123.  Id. at 4.  
 124.  Id. at 1–85. 
 125.  Id. at 17. 
 126.  Id. at 17–35. The committee’s recommendations and the court’s action 
on them are discussed in Louise Dovre Bjorkman & David F. Herr, Reducing Cost & 
Delay: Minnesota Courts Revise Civil Case Handling, BENCH & B. MINN., June 2013, 
at 26, 27–29. For general analysis of the need for proportionality, see Gordon W. 
Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather Than the 
Exception, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 513, 513–32 (2010). 
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litigation process earlier in the life of a case.127 This “front-loading” 
both accelerates the ultimate resolution of a case and reduces the 
cost spent on the litigation.128 Importantly, Minnesota’s rules now 
require that the parties get together to confer on the discovery and 
other case management needs of the case.129 This requirement 
applies to cases even where they are not yet filed.130 
Similarly, the new expedited motion practice for non-
dispositive motions,131 adopted upon the recommendation of the 
Task Force, will have particular impact on discovery motions.132 
Discovery motions are time consuming and result in delay of the 
litigation, and often present issues that can be decided fairly 
quickly once presented to the court. The expedited process is 
designed to deliver that efficiency in appropriate cases. The most 
important change is probably the proportionality rule. It is 
contained in Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which now provides: 
Rule 1. Scope of Rules 
These rules govern the procedure in the district 
courts of the State of Minnesota in all suits of a civil 
nature, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall 
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action. 
It is the responsibility of the court and the parties to 
examine each civil action to assure that the process and 
the costs are proportionate to the amount in controversy 
 
 127.  See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 36, § 2053 n.39 (citing Thomas E. Willging 
et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule 
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 563 (1998)). 
 128.  See Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really 
In Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 523 (1998) (reporting that users of 
litigation systems view disclosures as reducing cost of litigation and that judges 
should be involved earlier). But see John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The 
Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 581 (2010) (noting that 
critics have viewed front-loading of costs as creating a barrier to settlement).  
 129.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06. 
 130.  The parties are required to hold a discovery conference within thirty days 
from the initial due date of an answer. Id. R. 26.06. Because the Minnesota Rules 
do not require that the parties file the action until one year after it is commenced 
and commencement requires service but not filing, an action might not be filed 
for over ten months after the discovery conference is held. 
 131.  MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 115.04. 
 132.  RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 19. 
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and the complexity and importance of the issues. The 
factors to be considered by the court in making a 
proportionality assessment include, without limitation: 
needs of the case, amount in controversy, parties’ 
resources, and complexity and importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation.133 
This provision has no counterpart in the Federal Rules. It is 
modeled on language proposed by the Institute for the 
Advancement of the American Legal System.134 
It is impossible to predict just what impact this provision will 
have on the litigation process, but it is intended to prompt a 
fundamental shift in how courts and litigants address a wide variety 
of issues. Its placement in Rule 1 is intended to make it clear that it 
applies potentially to any aspect of the process.135 The goal behind 
the Task Force’s recommendation to and the court’s modification 
of Rule 26 was to modify the proportionality provision to make it 
clearer and more prominent.136 
The amendment requiring actions to be filed within one year 
of commencement is intended similarly to foster active judicial 
management.137 Although the responsibility to consider 
proportionality applies to the parties and attorneys, it is also an 
important responsibility of judges, and having cases under the 
supervision of a judge can be expected to reinforce the 
consideration of proportionality. 
X. ONGOING ISSUES REGARDING E-DISCOVERY AND THE RULES 
There are two notable ongoing issues regarding the current 
iteration of Minnesota’s procedural rules pertaining to e-discovery. 
First, although Minnesota has specifically adopted a “propor-
tionality” rule, it is yet to be seen how this rule will impact e-
 
 133.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. The second paragraph was added to the rule by the 
2013 amendment. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (2012), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 
(effective July 1, 2013). 
 134.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 21ST CENTURY 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM PILOT PROJECT RULES 2 (2009), 
available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Pilot 
_Project_Rules2009.pdf. 
 135.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 136.  Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b) (effective July 1, 2013), with MINN. R. 
CIV. P. 26.02(b)(3) (2012). 
 137.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04.  
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discovery. Second, the rules leave open the extent of litigants’ 
duties to preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI, 
and when the duty to preserve ESI arises. 
A. Proportionality 
E-discovery is not cheap. There are costs associated with 
identifying potentially relevant ESI; extracting and/or copying ESI; 
and then reviewing it, document by document, for responsiveness 
and privilege. Often, a vendor will have to be hired at the outset to 
copy the producing party’s hard drive, which will then have to be 
processed and converted into files that can be uploaded into the 
reviewing attorney’s document review database. These basic “first 
steps” can run into thousands of dollars, even before the producing 
party’s attorney has set eyes on a single document. The cost of 
e-discovery, when not properly balanced against the value of the 
case and the requesting party’s need for the requested ESI, 
results in the increased impetus for parties to settle their disputes 
prior to trial—regardless of the merits—rather than incur 
disproportionately large discovery fees. 
Although Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
now mandates that the court and the parties “examine each civil 
action to assure that the process and the costs are proportionate to 
the amount in controversy,” considering the “needs of the case, 
amount in controversy, parties’ resources, and complexity and 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation,”138 it provides no 
real guidance as to how this rule should apply to e-discovery. 
Likewise, although Rule 26.02 now states that discovery must 
“comport with the factors of proportionality,” it provides no greater 
clarification than Rule 1.139 Minnesota courts are left with wide 
discretion in interpreting and applying these rules. 
Although the Federal Rules do not specifically use the term 
proportionality, they likewise embrace that concept.140 The Sedona 
Conference recently addressed the concept of proportionality as it 
relates to the Federal Rules in The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery (“Sedona Conference Commentary”), 
 
 138.  Id. R. 1. 
 139.  Compare id., with id. R. 26.02(b). 
 140.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), (C) (placing limits on the scope of 
discovery). 
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recognizing that although the Federal Rules contemplate 
proportionality, courts have not always insisted upon it.141 The 
Sedona Conference Commentary suggests six principles in 
applying proportionality, which are equally applicable in state 
courts: 
1.  The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially 
relevant information should be weighed against the 
potential value and uniqueness of the information 
when determining the appropriate scope of 
preservation. 
2.  Discovery should generally be obtained from the most 
convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive 
source. 
3.  Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a 
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against 
that party. 
4.  Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the 
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently 
important to warrant the potential burden or expense 
of its production. 
5.  Nonmonetary factors should be considered when 
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery. 
6.  Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be 
considered in the proportionality analysis.142 
These principles “provide a framework for applying the doctrine of 
proportionality to all aspects of electronic discovery.”143 Given the 
untested nature of the proportionality amendments to Minnesota 
Rules 1 and 26, these principles may provide greater guidance to 
Minnesota courts in achieving the objectives of those rules. 
The Federal Advisory Committee is also considering 
amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules to explicitly 
provide for proportionality. The proposed amendment would 
provide that: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case considering the 
 
 141.  The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155, 155 (2013). 
 142.  Id. at 157. 
 143.  Id. at 158. 
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amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance 
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 
its likely benefit.144 
Because the items to be considered in evaluating proportionality 
under the proposed federal rule are substantially identical to those 
already listed in Minnesota’s current Rule 26.02(b), it is unlikely 
that adoption of this federal rule would have any significant impact 
on the current Minnesota rule.145 In fact, the Minnesota rule is 
arguably more restrictive than the proposed federal rule, as it 
allows discovery only of “matters that would enable a party to prove 
or disprove a claim or defense or to impeach a witness,” as opposed 
to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense.”146 
Although it has yet to be seen how Minnesota courts will apply 
the concept of proportionality to e-discovery, it is clear that if 
courts do not give weight to Minnesota’s proportionality rules, 
litigants may not be able to afford the cost of getting their cases 
ready for trial and may be forced to settle or voluntarily dismiss 
their claims, regardless of the merits. On the other hand, applied 
as intended, these rules have the potential to significantly decrease 
litigation discovery costs, which may afford litigants greater ability 
to see their cases through to judicial resolution. 
B. ESI Preservation Duties and Culpability for Failure to Preserve 
In addition to the issue of proportionality, the amendments to 
the Minnesota Rules also leave open the extent of litigants’ duties 
to preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI, and 
when the duty to preserve ESI arises. At present, the rules do not 
contain any specific provisions relating to the scope of litigants’ 
duties to preserve ESI, other than stating that sanctions for failing 
to provide ESI “lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation 
of an electronic information system” may not be imposed “[a]bsent 
 
 144.  Memorandum from David G. Campbell, supra note 18, at 20. 
 145.  If adopted, however, the proposed federal rule will lead to case law 
interpreting and applying its proportionality provision, which may provide 
persuasive guidance to Minnesota courts in applying Minnesota’s substantially 
identical proportionality provision.  
 146.  Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(1). 
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exceptional circumstances.”147 The 2007 Advisory Committee 
Comment recognized that “[t]he good-faith part of this test is 
important and is not met if a party fails to take appropriate steps to 
preserve data once a duty to preserve arises.”148 However, neither the 
rule nor the comment discusses when the duty to preserve arises. 
The 2007 Advisory Committee Comment to Minnesota Rule 37.05 
(which rule is identical to Federal Rule 37(e)) states that a duty to 
preserve arises “because of pending or reasonably anticipated 
litigation.”149 This is consistent with longstanding, and fairly 
uniform, Minnesota State150 and federal151 common law. 
Accordingly, although the rules themselves do not answer the 
question of “when” the duty to preserve ESI arises, for the time 
being litigants may continue to rely on case law to answer this 
question. 
 
 147.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05. 
 148.  Id. R. 37.05 advisory committee’s comment (2007 amendment) 
(emphasis added). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See, e.g., Miller v. Lankow, 801 N.W.2d 120, 127–28 (Minn. 2011); 
Frontier Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Metro. Council, No. 62-CV-08-2263, 2011 Minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 714, at *21–22 (Ct. App. July 25, 2011); Willis v. Ind. Harbor S.S. 
Co., 790 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Akre v. MetLife Auto & Home 
Ins. Co., No. A07-1683, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1002, at *13 (Ct. App. 
Aug. 19, 2008); Huhta v. Thermo King Corp., No. A03-1961, 2004 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 722, at *9–10 (Ct. App. June 29, 2004); Spaise v. Dodd, No. A03-1430, 2004 
Minn. App. LEXIS 607, at *28 (Ct. App. June 1, 2004); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. 
Heggie’s Full House Pizza, Inc., No. A03-316, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1241, at *12 
(Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Chase, No. C6-01-969, 2002 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 68, at *5 (Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2002); Garrison v. Farmers Coop. Exch., 
No. C1-00-657, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 1145, at *13 (Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2000); 
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Richway Indus., Ltd., No. C1-99-1963, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 
810, at *4 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2000); Henry v. Joseph, No. C2-98-181, 1998 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 948, at *11 (Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998); Wright v. Romfo, No. C4-95-
1818, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 340, at *10 (Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1996). 
 151.  E.g., Waters v. Cafesjian Family Found, Inc., No. 12-648 (RHK/LIB), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98378, at *6 (D. Minn. June 27, 2012); Cenveo Corp. v. S. 
Graphic Sys., Inc., No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104211, at *9–10 
(D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2010); Nicollet Cattle Co. v. United Food Grp., L.L.C., No. 08-
5899 (JRT/FLN), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92951, at *10–11 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 
2010); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1958 ADM/RLE, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96356, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2008); Capellupo v. FMC 
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989). 
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Neither the Federal or Minnesota Rules, nor the Federal or 
Minnesota Advisory Committees, have explained what types of ESI 
must be preserved. Although the Federal Advisory Committee 
noted that a party’s identification of ESI as “not reasonably 
accessible” does not relieve the party of its duty to preserve such 
evidence,152 the Advisory Committee did not offer any concrete 
guidance about what types of “not reasonably accessible” ESI must 
be preserved. Instead, it stated that “[w]hether a responding party 
is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially responsive 
information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends 
on the circumstances of each case.”153 
Likewise, the language of Federal Rule 37(e) and Minnesota 
Rule 37.05 is unclear as to whether a party may be sanctioned for 
“fail[ing] to suspend a deleting or overwriting program that 
routinely rids the company’s information system of data that are 
not reasonably accessible.”154 Despite the fact that these rules 
specifically state that sanctions for failing to provide ESI “lost as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system”155 may not be imposed “[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances,”156 courts have infrequently and inconsistently 
applied this provision157 and have often imposed discovery 
sanctions for spoliation of ESI after finding it inapplicable158 or 
 
 152.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 591 (2010). 
 155.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05. 
 156.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05. 
 157.  See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure 11 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts 
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2012.pdf (citing Thomas Y. 
Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation of ESI After the 2006 Amendments: The Impact of Rule 
37(e), 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 25, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation]; 
Thomas Y. Allman, Preservation Rulemaking After the 2010 Litigation Conference, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 227–28 (2010); Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: 
Has the 37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J. 
L. SCI. & TECH. 317, 333–39 (2010)). Only a handful of cases have been directly 
influenced by Rule 37(e) in precluding an award of sanctions. Id. (citing cases). 
 158.  See Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation, supra note 157, at 26 nn.2–4 (listing 
cases). 
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without referencing it at all.159 The unpredictability of litigants’ 
duties to preserve ESI, and their culpability for failing to preserve 
ESI, remain very much open issues under the current rules. 
The Federal Advisory Committee has proposed amendments 
to Rule 37(e) to address the current rule’s shortcomings. The 
proposed new rule reads: 
Rule 37(e). Failure to Make Disclosures or to 
Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions 
(e) Failure to Preserve Discoverable Information. 
(1) Curative measures; sanctions. If a party failed to 
preserve discoverable information that should have 
been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation, the court may 
(A) permit additional discovery, order curative 
measures, or order the party to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the 
failure; and 
(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 
37(b)(2)(A) or give an adverse-inference jury 
instruction, but only if the court finds that the 
party’s actions: 
(i) caused substantial prejudice in the 
litigation and were willful or in bad faith; or 
(ii) irreparably deprived a party of any 
meaningful opportunity to present or defend 
against the claims in the litigation. 
(2) Factors to be considered in assessing a party’s 
conduct. The court should consider all relevant factors 
in determining whether a party failed to preserve 
discoverable information that should have been 
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, 
and whether the failure was willful or in bad faith. The 
factors include: 
(A) the extent to which the party was on 
notice that litigation was likely and that the 
information would be discoverable; 
 
 159.  E.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. 
Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496–97 (S.D.N.Y 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port 
Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to 
preserve the information; 
(C) whether the party received a request to 
preserve information, whether the request was 
clear and reasonable, and whether the person who 
made it and the party consulted in good faith 
about the scope of preservation; 
(D) the proportionality of the preservation 
efforts to any anticipated or ongoing litigation; 
and 
(E) whether the party timely sought the 
court’s guidance on any unresolved disputes about 
preserving discoverable information.160 
The proposed amended rule would apply to all discoverable 
information, not just ESI.161 As clarified in the proposed Advisory 
Committee Note, “[t]he amended rule . . . forecloses reliance on 
inherent authority or state law to impose litigation sanctions in the 
absence of the findings required under Rule 37(e)(1)(B).”162 It is 
“designed to ensure that potential litigants who make reasonable 
efforts to satisfy their preservation responsibilities may do so with 
confidence that they will not be subjected to serious sanctions 
should information be lost despite those efforts.”163 
If the proposed amendments to Federal Rule 37(e) are 
adopted, it is likely that the Minnesota Advisory Committee will at 
some point evaluate whether to amend Rule 37.05 to parallel the 
new federal rule. Until then, the extent of litigants’ duties to 
preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI, and when 
the duty to preserve ESI arises remain open issues in both 
Minnesota state and federal courts. 
XI. THE FUTURE: THROUGH THE GLASS, DARKLY 
Prediction is a risky business. In ancient words, “Those who 
have knowledge, don’t predict. Those who predict, don’t have 
knowledge.”164 It is hard to divine with certainty where we may be 
headed with e-discovery. It seems clear that we can generate 
 
 160.  Memorandum from David G. Campbell, supra note 18, at 43–44. 
 161.  Id. at 44. 
 162.  Id. at 36. 
 163.  Id. at 44. 
 164.  Lao Tzu, Chinese Poet (6th Century BC).  
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mountains of electronic records that are not needed for the fair 
and inexpensive resolution of disputes and that cannot be handled 
in the litigation process. The litigation process cannot fairly be 
expected to function if it regularly consumes more dollars on 
litigation expenses than is in dispute in a particular case. 
E-discovery unquestionably contributes to the cost of litigating 
many—and an increasing number of—disputes. It is hard to 
foresee just what solutions will be put in place to minimize those 
costs, while still permitting the parties to obtain the information 
needed for the full and fair assessment of the merits of the parties’ 
disputes. 
A few changes in the system seem likely to take place. First, the 
proportionality provisions adopted in 2013 will change how 
litigants and courts approach discovery matters. Courts will have to 
consider the cost of discovery and balance it against the legitimate 
needs of the case. Whether the current provisions will accomplish 
this remains to be seen, but if they prove inadequate, the Advisory 
Committee and the Minnesota Supreme Court can be expected to 
come up with additional approaches to the proportionality 
challenge. 
A fundamental principle of discovery from the inception of 
the rules of civil procedure in both federal and state court has been 
that the cost of responding to discovery is borne by the party 
producing information.165 There have always been exceptions to 
this rule, and for discovery from nonparties the rule is typically 
reversed—the party requesting information from nonparties can be 
expected to bear the cost of responding.166 Because electronic 
discovery can impose tremendous burdens on the party having to 
locate, review, and produce information stored electronically, it is 
reasonable to foresee greater willingness to impose cost-sharing 
and cost-shifting presumptions for e-discovery. This is particularly 
likely to be combined with proportionality analysis, resulting in an 
increased willingness to impose costs on the requesting party when 
the requests are burdensome and they appear less related to the 
 
 165.  See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) 
(“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests . . . .”). See generally ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID 
F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 27.03[G] (5th ed. 2013). 
 166.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 45.02(d) (providing for compensation to certain 
subpoenaed nonparties). 
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issues being litigated or the importance of the requested 
information to resolving the issues. 
It is unlikely that these changes will be solely the result of 
simple adoption or modification of federal rules. The Civil Justice 
Reform Task Force approach adopted by the Court in 2013 
carefully avoided a single-faceted, rule-focused approach. The Task 
Force recommended rule changes but also implemented case 
management recommendations that are not simple rule changes. 
These non-rule changes may be important in future e-discovery 
reforms in Minnesota. The Task Force recommended that courts 
make greater use of judicial adjuncts to help resolve pretrial 
disputes.167 Encouraging the courts and parties to make use of 
special masters to help resolve e-discovery disputes would not 
require rule changes—Rule 53 was completely revamped in 2005, 
effective on January 1, 2006, and provides ample basis for 
appointing masters for this purpose.168 
Similarly, the broad goal of encouraging cooperation can be 
addressed in a wide variety of ways. The Task Force recommended 
that the Minnesota courts adopt the Sedona Conference’s 
Cooperation Proclamation.169 This is just one change to help 
prompt the necessary changes in the approach to litigation issues. 
It may well be that other approaches will be implemented. 
 
 167.  RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 31. 
 168.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 53. See generally 2 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED §§ 53.01–.09 (5th ed. 2011) 
(discussing Rule 53 and the 2005 amendment); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. 
Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347 (2008) (discussing the 
special role of special masters in e-discovery). 
 169.  RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 35. 
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